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FIGHTING POVERTY TO FIGHT TERRORISM: SECURITY IN DfID’s 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY DURING THE WAR ON TERROR 
 
Abstract 
This article builds on existing research on the securitisation of development aid 
following 9/11. Investigating arguments that the UK’s concern is with security at 
home and not the security of developing states, the policy discourse of the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DfID) is examined through its four major 
policy documents and two major security documents for the period from the late 
1990s to the late 2000s. Two levels of analysis are used; a content analysis, and a 
discourse analysis. This article argues that DfID has: given increasing space to 
conflict and security and, after initial restrictions placed on DfID’s involvement in 
security in the late 1990s, security has become a key development concern during the 
War on Terror. In the process the goal of Human Security - to place development 
issues as security concerns - has been reversed and, instead, DfID has included 
security as a development problem. 
 
Key Words: Security–development nexus, failed states, War on Terror, Human 
Security, radicalism, security, development 
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Introduction 
It has been argued that there has been a shift in development since 9/11 to meet 
security1 concerns. This is evident in attempts to coordinate development and security 
policies, leading to a closer relationship between development and military actors in 
the field. In the case of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), development spending has become overtly connected to political 
considerations (Hills 2006: 630). With the US shifting its development policies to 
meet security concerns since 9/11, the fear among commentators (Ellis 2004; 
Carmody 2005; Ingram 2007; Bagoyoko and Gibert 2009; Shannon 2009; Bachman 
and Hönke 2010) is that development concerns will be subverted by security 
considerations. However, it remains unclear to what extent this shift in focus has 
extended to other bilateral players.   
 
The UK is an interesting case in this regard in that its Department for International 
Development (DfID) operates independently of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, whereas USAID is controlled by the State Department. There is disagreement 
among commentators over whether DfID has maintained a poverty focus or whether it 
has shifted to addressing security concerns albeit in a more subtle way than USAID.  
Whilst some argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty alleviation over 
security concerns (Beall et al 2006; Fitz-Gerald 2006; Youngs 2007; Wild and 
Elhawary 2012), still others claim that UK development policy has become 
securitised and is geared towards protecting the West from the dangers caused by the 
underdevelopment of non-Western states (Abrahamsen 2004, 2005; Duffield and 
Waddell 2006; Carmody 2011). While these contributions add much to our 
understanding of this issue, they are largely based on analyses of particular moments 
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in time rather than over a longer time period. This is the purpose of this article which 
analyses DfID’s policy discourse through its four major policy documents and two 
major security documents for the period from the late 1990s to the late 2000s. 
 
This article addresses this gap in the literature by exploring how DfID has changed its 
position on policy issues from the pre-9/11 period to the late 2000s. Using two levels 
of analysis - a content analysis and a discourse analysis, it is argued that after initial 
restrictions placed on DfID’s involvement in security in the late 1990s, security 
concerns more strongly informed DfID’s work during the so-called War on Terror. 
The areas that are considered security issues have been expanded to include terrorism, 
political extremism and failed states. The result of this, it is argued, is an 
appropriation of the main tenets of Human Security by DfID in order to justify the 
increased involvement in hard security concerns. This is significant as it increases the 
understanding of how DfID’s policy has changed following 9/11 in detail not 
provided by other work in this area. This work has implications for how other states 
have engaged with the merging of security and development and the broader debates 
regarding the impact of the concept of Human Security and the hegemonic influence 
of the US. The argument is developed as follows.  In the following section, the 
literature on the merging of security and development is outlined.  Following this, is a 
brief discussion of the definitional problems around the merging of security and 
development. The next three sections outline how DfID has: changed its approach to 
poverty, changed its approach to security and conflict and adopted security concerns 
related to the WoT in its discourse. Leading on from this is a discussion of DfID’s 
engagement with Human Security. Lastly is a conclusion discussing the broader 
implications of this research. 
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The Securitisation of Development Aid Post-9/11 
 
The Security-Development Nexus as Human Security  
 
The connection between security and development is not a recent phenomenon. The 
broadening of security discourse to include human development concerns has been 
apparent since the 1990s. The principle aim of Human Security was to place the 
individual as the referent object of security and not the state (Newman 2001: 239; 
UNDP 1994). Fundamental to this was the realisation that war was increasingly 
taking place within the boundaries of states and that inter-state war was on the 
decline. These wars could not be confined within their state boundaries and 
destabilised whole regions through refugee flows and spill-over violence (UN 1999; 
Kerr 2007: 93). The concept of Human Security arose as a means to address these 
complex conflicts by dealing with the root causes to human insecurity that eventually 
lead to violence (Henk 2005; Kerr 2007: 93). The concept is split between those who 
favour a narrow approach focusing on immediate threats to safety and a broad 
approach that includes more systemic long term threats to security (King and Murray 
2002: 591; McCormack 2011: 101). There is a debate about the usefulness of the 
concept of human security and the manner in which states have engaged with it 
(Duffield and Waddell 2006; Ambrosetti 2008; Chandler 2008; McArthur 2008; 
Owen 2008; Wibben 2008). As the concept is so broad, it can be readily be co-opted 
by states through a reference to part of this broad agenda (Chandler 2008: 430). By 
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selectively drawing on certain parts and ignoring other parts of this broad agenda, the 
impression is created that states now subscribe to a new paradigm of security focusing 
on the individual. Furthermore, continued involvement in conventional state-centric 
security issues can be framed as part of a Human Security agenda through this 
selective engagement with the subject. This paper examines DfID’s engagement with 
the concept of Human Security in greater detail. 
 
 
It has been argued that the idea of merging security and development goals found the 
coherence it previously lacked following 9/11 (Duffield 2006; Howell and Lind 
2009). With the attacks on New York and Washington, by al Qaeda, the chaotic 
environment of a ‘failed state’ was seen as providing a haven for international 
terrorist organisations and an ideal ground for terrorist recruitment (Tschirgi 2006: 
50). As a result, chronic problems of underdevelopment were perceived as a threat to 
international security. It has been argued by academics and development actors that, 
rather than attracting greater finance and attention for development issues in their own 
right, development concerns have been subsumed by security concerns (Waddell 
2006; Duffield 2006, 2010). While Human Security sought to acquire a larger budget 
and greater political attention for development issues by framing them as security 
issues, it seems that instead development projects have been used for military 
purposes since 9/11. For example, it is argued that the US’s President’s Emergency 
Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) prioritised treating the military in Nigeria rather than 
citizens (Ingram 2007: 516). This article seeks to build on this literature through an 
in-depth study of the UK.  
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Security in DfID’s Development Policy 
 
There is disagreement in the literature around DfID’s engagement with security post-
9/11. On the one hand Fitz-Gerald (2006: 118) , Waddell (2006: 543-546) and 
Youngs (2007: 11) argue that DfID has maintained a firm stance on poverty 
alleviation over security concerns to the point of clashing with the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) over projects that prioritised foreign policy over poverty alleviation. 
However, as Howell and Lind (2009: 1288) point out, rather than a renewed poverty 
focus, a clear shift of development spending to meet WoT demands can be seen in the 
status of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as DfID’s top recipients, whereas prior to 
2001 they were not in the top 20 recipients. Indeed as Table 1 shows, DfID’s 
engagement in so-called fragile or failed states and strategic states in the war on terror 
has increased significantly over the period under investigation. The frontline WoT 
states of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are consistently among DfID’s top 10 
recipients following 2001. In addition states identified as conflict affected and fragile 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan are also among DfID’s top 10 
recipients over this time.  
 
In addition, both Denny (2011) and Krogstad (2012) are critical of DfID’s 
engagement with the security sector in Sierra Leone arguing that while state security 
has been bolstered, the security needs of individuals have on been adequately 
addressed. Studies on DfID’s policy discourse have produced conflicting results, with 
some commentators arguing that developing countries are seen as a source of 
insecurity to the West and that development aid is now used as a conflict resolution 
tool to shape the behaviour of African states so that they conform to liberal values of 
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the free market economy and democracy (Abrahamsen 2004; Duffield and Waddell 
2006; Stern and Öjendal 2010). Others claim that DfID’s leading principle is that the 
security of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable is of utmost importance and 
should be prioritised over the security of Western donor countries (Beall et al 2006: 
58; Wild and Elhawary 2012).  
 
None of the existing studies on DfID’s policy discourse examine its key policy 
documents over an extended period of time. Although the contributions of 
Abrahamsen (2004, 2005) analysing  the public speeches of key state officials, 
Duffield and Waddell (2006) who draw on interviews with DfID officials and Stern 
and Öjendal (2010) and Beall et al (2006) who examine excerpts of DfID’s 2005 
security document offer interesting insights into the subject, they focus on particular 
moments in time and so lack the perspective offered by covering an extended period 
of time. This article complements this work through an analysis of DfID White Paper 
publications from 1997, 2000, 2006 and 20092 in addition to the aid policy review 
document from the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition government from 20113 and 
DfID’s Security documents from 1999 and 2005.4 The choice of documents represents 
all the White Papers published by DfID since it was established, the first major aid 
policy statement from the coalition government elected in 2010 and DfID’s two 
security documents to date.  
 
Two levels of analysis are employed. Firstly a content analysis gives a broad picture 
of patterns of word use within the documents. The terms ‘poor’ and ‘poverty’ are 
chosen as reflective of a pro-poor development focus, whereas the terms ‘security’ 
and ‘terrorism’ are taken to imply a conventional hard security focus. The terms 
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‘human rights’ or ‘stability’ could be considered to reflect either development or 
security concerns. As the words ‘poverty’ and ‘security’ can be used in multiple 
contexts, so in order to capture this, different variations of these words are counted. 
As Tables 2 and 3 show, for ‘poverty’ different variants of ‘poverty elimination’ and 
the more qualified ‘poverty reduction’ are also counted. Similarly the count for 
‘security’ is separated out into conventional security, ‘human security’ and ‘security 
sector reform’ as a way of capturing the different ways in which security is used. In 
addition to this, the word ‘security’ is not counted when it refers to something clearly 
outside of conventional security - for example the term ‘social security’. The term 
‘development’ was initially considered as being indicative of a strong poverty focus. 
However, the word was used in such a high frequency across all documents that it was 
not considered to be revealing of any patterns or deeper meaning.   
 
On the basis of the results of the content analysis, a discourse analysis is conducted 
across sections of text that contrast across the documents. These two methods are 
complementary, with the content analysis allowing precise measurement of changes 
in words used across documents that the more detailed discourse analysis misses. In 
turn, the discourse analysis allows a more detailed examination of the way in which 
words are used in context which a content analysis misses. The sections are laid out 
with the broader pattern shown by the content analysis discussed first, followed by the 
more detailed discourse analysis.  In total, this analysis covers 536,038 words over 
550 pages of text. The findings of this analysis are presented below. Table 2 shows 
the frequency of key security and development terms across all documents. Table 3 
shows these counts as a percentage of the words counted for each document to allow 
comparison across documents of uneven length. 
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Defining the Concepts of ‘Security’ and ‘Development’ 
 
The terms ‘development’ and ‘security’ both have numerous different meanings 
(Stern and Öjendal 2010: 6). In its 1997 White Paper, DfID deals with the problem of 
the contested meaning of development by narrowing it down to poverty elimination. 
In this way the different interpretations of the concept of development can be 
narrowed down to whether it benefited the poor or not. Similarly, from 1997 to 2000, 
security is framed as being focused on the poorest, which is consistent with the 
concept of Human Security. This focused approach changes post 9/11. The 2005 
document places security on an equal footing with other development issues and 
further includes terrorism, fragile states and radicalism as security, and therefore 
development issues. As a result, DfID’s definition of security loses clarity. The 2006 
White Paper gives significant attention to the relationship between security and 
development. The overt statement that ‘Without security there cannot be 
development’ (DfID 2006: 37) is not matched by an explicit statement that the reverse 
is also true. In other words, development is a precondition for security. Placing the 
issue of security in the primary position before development shows a significant shift 
from the poverty focus to security of the first two White Papers from 1997 and 2000. 
This shift will be demonstrated below. 
 
Redefining the Approach to Poverty 
 
The main title of all four of DfID’s White Papers is Eliminating World Poverty. The 
term is an unambiguous statement of DfID’s approach to global poverty. As outlined 
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in Table 2, the 1997 White Paper reflects this. In 52 of 110 instances that poverty is 
mentioned it is referred to in terms of ‘eliminating’ poverty. The more muted and 
qualified term ‘poverty reduction’ is only mentioned nine times. However, in the 
subsequent White Paper published in 2000 there is a shift to talking about poverty in 
terms of ‘reduction’ and not ‘elimination’. Of the 147 times ‘poverty’ is mentioned 
only seven refer to ‘elimination’ and 81 refer to ‘reduction’. This change continues 
post 9/11 with only five and six references to poverty elimination in 2006 and 2009 
respectively, as set out in Table 2. Further to this, as Table 3 shows, mention of 
poverty reduction falls as percentage of words counted from a high of 14 % in 2000 to 
less than 1 % in 2011. Overall this shows a redefinition of DfID’s ambition towards 
poverty away from ‘elimination’ to the more limited ‘reduction’ and, following this, a 
decline in the amount of times poverty is mentioned in the context of any specific 
goal, be it elimination or reduction.  
 
It is worth noting that the 2006 document mentions ‘poverty elimination’ the same 
amount of times as ‘terrorism’, and only twice more than ‘radicalisation’. In the 2009 
document it is mentioned one time less than ‘terrorism’ and twice more than 
‘radicalisation’, as shown in Table 2. The equal attention given to both terrorism and 
poverty elimination in a development policy document specifically to do with 
eliminating poverty demonstrates a clear example of the merging of security and 
development during the WoT.  
 
Beall, Goodfellow and Putzel (2006: 61) argue that the 2005 strategy paper is a 
proactive attempt to define the relationship by insisting that the only justification for 
DfID getting involved in security issues is if it is of benefit to the poor. Whilst this is 
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a valid interpretation of the 2005 document, the benefit of also assessing the White 
Papers published before and after this strategy paper shows a pattern in DfID’s policy 
discourse on security. As will be demonstrated further below, over the period of the 
late 1990s to the late 2000s there has been a widening of what DfID defines as 
involvement in security to include issues of international security with only an 
indirect link to poverty. In the 2009 White Paper, poverty is placed as the cause of a 
number of international security problems such as terrorism, political extremism and 
fragile states. In this way DfID can claim to be maintaining a poverty focus while at 
the same time allowing issues such as terrorism to be included in its policy, as the 
connection has been made with development and poverty.  
 
Security as a Development Concern 
 
Connecting Development to Security before 9/11 
 
As Table 3 shows, conflict appears as a development issue in the first two White 
Papers, counting for 8 % and 9 % of the words counted for 1997 and 2000 
respectively. However, post 9/11 this increases significantly with 17 % and 18 % in 
the 2006 and 2009 white papers respectively, before falling slightly to 13 % in the 
2011 policy review. This pattern is repeated in the security documents with a count of 
14 % in 1999 rising to 22 % in 2005, as can be seen in Table 3. Rather than an abrupt 
change following 9/11, the increase in space given to conflict in documents can be 
viewed as a continuation of an earlier trend seen between the 1997 and 2000 
documents, as is the case with the decline in the use of the term ‘poverty reduction’.  
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Analysing the discourse across these documents the increasing space given to security 
even prior to 9/11 is readily apparent. There is no mention of the merging of security 
and development in the 1997 White Paper, but the way in which security is mentioned 
in the 1999 document is very specific and places definite limits on the relationship 
between development aid and security. 
 
We can only work where there are legitimate civilian authorities with the 
capacity to control the security forces, who recognise the need for reform and 
want our assistance and are ready to play an active part in the process. (DfID 
1999: 2).  
 
This shows a commitment to working in the area of security, but only in the area of 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) and on the conditions of civilian oversight and the 
accountability of armed forces. It is also asserted that SSR programmes must 
primarily benefit the poor (DfID 1999: 3). The limits for DfID’s involvement in 
security are set at the poorest being the focus of the policy and sufficient civilian 
oversight of the armed forces.  
 
In addition, DfID distances itself from getting involved in traditional hard security 
concerns for fear of development goals being subverted. 
 
The underlying assumption should be that development funds will not be used 
for such activities, which primarily involve sector-wide programmes of 
assistance to the uniformed security forces or intelligence services……they 
carry an especially strong likelihood that development objectives will be seen 
as secondary or alternatively displaced by other objectives. (DfID 1999: 6).  
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Taken together this shows that DfID’s pre-9/11 relationship with security is limited 
specifically to SSR, only on the condition that the poor would benefit most and that 
there was adequate civilian control of the military, so as to avoid abuses. This can be 
viewed in the broader context of the creation of Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) by 
the British government which involved DfID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) and the MoD collaborating on conflict resolution projects (Fitz-Gerald 2006: 
114). As the UK’s development agency was formerly a part of the FCO prior to the 
founding of DfID there would understandably be tension in a collaboration between 
them (Young 1999: 263). When viewed in this light the 1999 document could be a 
case of DfID proactively defining its relationship to security services in a very 
specific and limited way.   
 
The 2000 White Paper also places limits on DfID’s involvement in security, focuses 
on SSR and asserts that the poorest and most vulnerable must be the referent object of 
security. There is recognition that security forces that are not democratically 
accountable are often a source of insecurity for ordinary people (DfID 2000: 23), and 
that overspending on security detracts from development (DfID 2000: 30). There is no 
specific mention of the security of Western states as a justification for DfID’s 
involvement in security. Taken together this tells us that DfID’s position on security 
pre-9/11, consistent with Human Security, was clearly defined as supporting SSR for 
the benefit of poor people in developing countries and was designed to be separate 
from traditional hard security concerns due to the danger of development goals being 
subverted. This position changes after 9/11. 
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Connecting Security and Development Aid after 9/11 
 
Following 9/11 DfID broadens its definition of security to include conventional state-
centric security issues as well as Human Security issues. The first document in this 
sample published after 9/11, the 2005 security document, shows a marked difference 
from the earlier approach. 
 
Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as 
much as they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. In recent years, 
DFID has begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking and practice. 
But we need to do more. As the Prime Minister said in his speech to the World 
Economic Forum this year, “it is absurd to choose between an agenda focusing 
on terrorism and one on global poverty”. (DfID 2005: 3). 
 
Security is now placed in the same category as clean water, education and healthcare. 
This significantly broadens DfID’s involvement in security matters beyond the pre-
9/11 focus on SSR. It also shows a reversal of the Human Security agenda which 
seeks to gain more attention for development issues by framing them as security 
issues, as discussed above. Now, instead of development problems being framed as 
security problems and therefore deserving of the same urgency and attention, security 
is instead portrayed as a development issue. The assertion that ‘we need to do more’ 
suggests an opening up of DfID’s involvement in security which previously had 
specific limits placed upon it.   
 
In addition there is an overt conflation of the goals of development aid and the WoT, 
with the fight against poverty being equated with the WoT. This statement is balanced 
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by restating the commitment to keep the poorest as the focus of security policies; 
‘Promoting the security of the poor is, however, not the same thing as promoting the 
security of states’ (DfID 2005: 5), and reasserting that development goals will not be 
subsumed into security considerations; ‘But this does not mean that aid should be put 
at the service of global security. Poverty reduction is a UK and an international goal 
in its own right’ (DfID 2005: 13). DfID also tries to distance itself from traditional 
hard security concerns; ‘Security concerns should not be a justification for allowing 
violations of human rights’ (DfID 2005: 15).  This leads to a less coherent approach to 
security and development than in either the 1999 security document or the 2000 
White Paper. Whilst security is placed as a development priority the same as clean 
water or education, how it will be achieved and in what circumstances DfID can get 
involved are far less clear.  
 
This theme of merging security and development is continued in the 2006 White 
Paper. For the first time in a DfID White Paper the relationship is expressed explicitly 
‘Security is a precondition for development’, and again, ‘Without security there 
cannot be development’ (DfID 2006: 45). However, the reverse of this assertion, that 
development is a precondition for security, is not stated. In addition, the conditions 
mentioned in the 2005 document are not reiterated in the 2006 White Paper (DfID 
2006: 47). There is no mention of conditions regarding adequate civilian oversight, 
democratic accountability and a clear poverty-focused justification.  
 
The conditions attached to DfID’s involvement in security in the 2005 security 
document are complex, such as a state strong enough to administer services, but not 
dictatorial and unaccountable and with sufficient civilian oversight of the armed 
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forces, and specifically for the benefit of the poorest. From this a contradiction 
emerges where security is placed at the same level as access to clean water or 
healthcare, although these are taken as absolutes, security has a number of conditions 
attached to it. This shows the difficulty of DfID merging development and security 
concerns; the relationship between security and development is accepted, but there is 
an awareness of the controversy surrounding it in the development community and the 
potential for misuse of development funds on military spending at the cost of the most 
vulnerable. So, on the one hand, the interdependence of security and development is 
accepted, but on the other, there is an attempt to restrict and limit the conditions 
where DfID will become involved in security spending. This position changes again 
in the 2006 White Paper with a definitive statement on the primacy of security in this 
relationship, without a reiteration of the conditions attached to DfID’s involvement in 
security. This shows the complexity of DfID trying to bring a broader definition of 
security, which conflicts with its earlier focus on the well-being of the individual, into 
its development policy. This removes the contradictions that exist in the 2005 
document, but also the more nuanced understanding of security, and results in DfID 
accepting security as part of its development policy without condition.  
 
This acceptance of security as an absolute coincides with a broadening of what DfID 
considers to be a security issue and a connection of poverty to international security 
threats such as terrorism and political extremism. The increasing space given to 
security in successive DfID policy documents is a reflection of the institutional 
changes within the UK government over this period. This saw increased collaboration 
between DfID and the foreign policy (FCO) and military (MoD) institutions of 
government post-9/11. From assisting postconflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone in 
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2002 through SSR programmes to direct involvement in military exercises through 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Stabilisation Units in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, DfID’s direct involvement in national security issues has increased 
dramatically since 9/11. In addition, as highlighted above in Table 1, DfID has also 
increased its spending on these frontline states in the WoT. Over this period DfID 
increasingly uses language associated with the WoT. This is reflected in the context in 
which new terms are used following 9/11. 
 
Fighting Poverty to fight Terrorism 
 
The content analysis shows that the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘fragile state’ appear 
only in the documents published post 9/11. ‘Radicalisation’ appears three and four 
times in the 2006 and the 2009 White Papers respectively, once in the 2011 policy 
document and once in the 2005 security document, as can be seen in Table 2. Whilst 
the numbers are relatively small, their presence in a development policy document is 
noteworthy. The term ‘fragile state’ is mentioned four times in the 2005 security 
document 18 times in the 2006 White Paper, 46 times in the 2009 White Paper and 
twice in the 2011 policy document. The term ‘terrorism’ could be put in this category 
too as it appears only once before 9/11, in the 2000 White Paper, whereas in the 2005 
security document it appears 25 times, in the 2006 and 2009 White Papers it appears 
five and seven times respectively and once in the 2011 policy document. Taken 
together ‘radicalisation’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘fragile states’ can be taken to represent 
increased security concerns in the wake of the WoT. The increasing concern with 
‘failed states’, such as Afghanistan following 9/11, the concern with political 
extremism and radicalisation and the focus on terrorism as a threat to international 
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security are all part of UK and US foreign policy in the WoT. These concerns are not 
just confined to policy documents and are reflected in DfID’s development spending. 
As discussed above, Table 1 shows that DfID’s has prioritised fragile states and 
frontline states in the WoT in its ODA spending over this period. The presence of 
these terms in DfID’s documents reflects a change as greater space is now given to 
foreign policy concerns within development policy documents.  
 
Terrorism, Failed States and Radicalism as Development Problems in the WoT 
 
The only mention of terrorism prior to 9/11 is in the 2000 White Paper. As mentioned 
above, words associated with security and development can have different meanings 
depending on the context in which they are used. Here ‘terrorism’ is mentioned as one 
of a number of international security threats such as environmental degradation that 
are caused or made worse by poverty (DfID 2000: 7). This presents a justification for 
tackling poverty by providing a solution for numerous international problems. Of 
these issues, terrorism is portrayed as one of many problems, but not the sole or even 
main concern.  
 
The way terrorism is framed as a development problem changes significantly after 
9/11. As mentioned above, the foreword to the 2005 document states that the fight 
against global poverty and terrorism are inseparable (DfID 2005: 3). This position is 
justified by connecting poverty and insecurity to terrorism; ‘Poverty, 
underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict and the 
emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism’ (DfID 
2005: 5). In this statement the connection is made between poverty, fragile states and 
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terrorism. Similar to the term ‘terrorism’, ‘fragile/failed states’ are not mentioned in 
any of the pre-9/11 documents. As the above quote shows, when the term is used it is 
as a conduit that connects poverty and underdevelopment to terrorism. This is shown 
again in highlighting Afghanistan, the source of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the focal 
point for the launch of the WoT, as a fragile state (DfID 2005: 8). DfID’s emphasis on 
common interest can be seen in the way the 2005 strategy paper highlights the impact 
of terrorism on developing countries (DfID 2005: 7). In this way the argument is 
constructed that terrorism is caused by poverty, so therefore fighting poverty will 
fight terrorism and also terrorism impacts on developing countries directly, so 
therefore fighting terrorism can help to fight poverty.  
 
There is a reassertion of DfID’s pro-poor focus; ‘This does not mean subordinating 
poverty reduction to short term political interests or to work on antiterrorism’ (DfID 
2005: 6). However, there remains a contradiction in the 2005 document, where the 
fight against terrorism is framed as being inseparable from the fight against poverty, 
yet it disregards the political realities of the WoT by stating that DfID will not allow 
its poverty focused agenda to be subverted by antiterrorism activities. The 2006 
document frames the issue of civil conflict as an international security risk because of 
how it connects to terrorism, ‘And violent conflict and insecurity can spill over into 
neighbouring countries and provide cover for terrorists or organised criminal groups’ 
(DfID 2006: 45). Conflict is now not only a development concern but also an 
international security concern because it can create havens for terrorists. The 2009 
White Paper makes the connection between poverty and terrorism once again by 
stating that ‘More effective states in poorer countries could make it more difficult for 
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terrorist organisations to recruit from, train in and transit those countries’ (DfID 2009: 
17).  
 
Both the 2006 and 2009 White Papers connect poverty to terrorism and other 
development problems of fragile states and radicalisation. When fragile states are 
mentioned, in the 2006 White Paper, Somalia and Afghanistan are cited as specific 
examples, firstly as a source of poverty (DfID 2006: 7), and secondly as providing a 
haven for terrorists; ‘They (terrorists) exploit poverty and exclusion in order to tap 
into popular discontent – taking advantage of fragile states such as Somalia, or 
undemocratic regimes such as in Afghanistan in the 1990s, to plan violence’ (DfID 
2006: 47). The use of these two examples; Afghanistan - the source of the 9/11 
attacks, and Somalia - where Islamic terrorists in Africa are expected to be operating 
(Ingram 2007: 520), is revealing. For example, both Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire 
were ranked higher than Afghanistan and Somalia in a list of the top 10 failed states in 
2006 (The Fund for Peace 2006) and both suffer from extreme poverty, yet neither 
state is mentioned. For a development policy document to reference two strategically 
important states in the WoT as examples of failed states demonstrates a merging of 
security and development concerns in DfID’s policy discourse. The 2009 White Paper 
also makes the connection between fragile states, poverty, political extremism and 
terrorism: ‘State failure and radicalisation such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan has 
brought terror to New York and London as well as Mumbai and Islamabad’(DfID 
2009: 15-16). This excerpt is revealing as it connects state failure to terrorist attacks 
both in Western states and in developing countries, making the connection between 
‘their’ security and ‘our’ security. The connection is also made between state failure, 
radicalisation and terrorism. This shows a blurring of the boundaries between hard 
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security concerns of the WoT and development goals. This is done by connecting: 
poverty, to security of the poorest, to state failure, to terrorism to UK national 
security. 
 
The use of the term ‘radicalisation’ stands out as curious in a development document. 
The first mention is in the 2005 strategy paper with a reference to failures of 
governance leading to radicalisation which is dangerous because it can provide a 
haven for terrorists (DfID 2005: 12). The 2006 White Paper again connects the fight 
against poverty and radicalisation: ‘Fighting poverty and social exclusion through 
better governance therefore contributes to security – locally and internationally – and 
helps to reduce the potential for radicalisation or extreme political violence’ (DfID 
2006: 47). The 2009 White Paper builds on this and frames radicalism as a threat to 
international security ‘Weak government and feelings of exclusion become breeding 
grounds for resentment and radicalism, threatening peace and security around the 
world’ (DfID 2009: 16). In this case, radicalisation is not connected directly to 
terrorism, but is a threat to peace and security at a global level. The 2011 document 
takes this further by stating that extremism is a development problem that ‘might 
otherwise arrive on our streets’ (DfID 2011: 36). This is significant as it shows a shift 
from radicalisation not being mentioned as a development problem, to associating it 
with terrorism in 2005, to framing it as a problem within states that can be helped by 
development policies and SSR in 2006, to expressing radicalisation as an international 
security issue in 2009 and 2011. The references to ‘radicalisation’, relatively few 
though they are, are revealing of DfID’s development policy. By 2009 it is placed not 
just as a threat to development in poorer countries but as a threat to international 
security which will ‘bring terror’ to ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
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Development as National Security 
 
A key question within the merging of security and development is whose security 
takes priority? One of Rita Abrahamsen’s (2004, 2005) criticisms of the UK’s 
development policy is that ‘our’ security in the West takes priority over ‘their’ 
security in the developing world. This approach is evident in the 2009 White Paper.  
Prior to 2009, connections between security in the developing world and security in 
the West are expressed in the positive sense with the framing of poverty elimination 
as a moral duty that will provide a safer future for ‘us all’ (DfID 1997: Introduction, 
DfID 2000: 6, DfID 2006: 6). The connection of eliminating poverty and a more 
secure world for future generations is aspirational rather than fearful. The justification 
of creating a world without mass poverty is that it will create a safer future for us as 
well.  
 
However, in the 2009 White Paper there is a change to expressing the connection 
between their security and our security in terms of fear and danger.  Here the 
connection is made between instability and radicalisation in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
and global security (DfID 2009: 80), specifically terrorist attacks on Western states: 
‘State failure and radicalisation such as in Afghanistan and Pakistan has brought terror 
to New York and London as well as Mumbai and Islamabad’ (DfID 2009: 15-16). 
The connection of ‘our’ security to instability in the developing world is not in the 
same aspirational tone of the previous White Papers. The overt portrayal of instability 
in the developing world as a direct threat to the developed world and the repeated use 
of Afghanistan as an example both indicate a move away from an approach based on 
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compassion and humanitarianism towards one based on fear. The emotive use of the 
9/11 and 7/7 attacks to demonstrate the connection between ‘them’ and ‘us’ shows a 
marked change in tone from the other documents and represents a further 
entrenchment of WoT concerns in DfID’s policy discourse in the 2009 White Paper. 
This continues from the Labour government to the coalition government with the 
2011 aid review document making overt connections between development problems 
and UK national security (DfID 2011: 2; 36). In addition to this a 2010 leaked memo 
from the newly formed UK National Security Council (NSC) stated that development 
aid should make a maximum possible contribution to UK national security (Watt 
2010). This overt connection made between development and national security shows 
a dramatic shift from the approach of the pre-911 period and is likely a consequence 
of broader foreign policy pressures on DfID. Overall, this shift in DfID’s discourse is 
best understood through the manner in which it engages with the concept of Human 
Security. 
 
Turning Human Security on its Head 
 
David Chandler (2008: 430) argues that Human Security does not represent a direct 
counterpoint to realist, state-centric security as is often claimed and that the two 
positions overlap significantly. As a result, he argues, Human Security has been 
adopted into mainstream policy quite readily and Human Security advocates 
themselves have portrayed a realist self-interest angle to Human Security as the best 
strategy to bring security to the international system (Chandler 2008: 430). The broad 
nature of human security and the contested nature of the concept between the broad 
and narrow schools5 means it can easily be co-opted by governments (Chandler 2008: 
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430). Human Security appeals to states for three reasons according to Chandler. 
Firstly, it exaggerates new security threats in the WoT. Secondly, it facilitates short 
term policy making divorced from policy outcome. And thirdly it locates the source of 
Western insecurity in the developing world (Chandler 2008: 428). Similarly, Duffield 
and Waddell describe Human Security as a way in which Western governments and 
institutions ‘categorise, separate and act upon Southern populations’, rather than an 
objective achievable policy (Duffield and Waddell 2006: 2). Examining DfID’s 
relationship to Human Security best explains the increased space given to security 
issues in DfID’s policy discourse pre-9/11. The goal of placing development issues as 
security issues was seen as a way for developing states to gain greater attention and 
urgency for development concerns by placing them in global security discussions 
post-9/11 (Chandler 2008: 429). DfID’s statement that security is now a development 
concern the same as access to clean water or education (DfID 2005: 3) sees a 
complete reversal of this agenda. Instead of development concerns being dealt with as 
security issues, now security has been accepted by DfID as part of its development 
agenda.  
 
A closer examination of DfID’s use of the term Human Security reveals a complex 
relationship between security and development. The sole reference to Human Security 
in the 1999 security policy statement makes a clear distinction between conventional 
security and Human Security: 
 
Activities which provide direct assistance to the uniformed security forces 
may contain the risk that the support may be used to facilitate or legitimise 
activities which do not contribute to an improvement in human security but 
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instead lead to abuses of human rights by strengthening or legitimising the 
power of the security forces. (DfID 1999: 6). 
 
Here the conditions of providing assistance to the armed forces are conditional upon 
Human Security needs being met specifically as distinct from the needs of the state, 
which has in the past been a source of insecurity to its own citizens. The term Human 
Security does not appear in any of DfID’s White Papers. The only other time it 
appears in the sample examined is in the 2005 Security Strategy Paper. The first 
mention is in reference to the need for closer collaboration between security and 
development actors in order to address threats to human security. This representation 
of Human Security shows a particular interpretation of the concept - that is the 
necessity to merge development and security actors - which is very much in 
accordance with the narrow approach. This is consistent with Chandler’s arguments 
on the selective use of the concept. 
 
The other reference in the 2005 strategy paper deals with the issue of tension arising 
from the merging of security and development agendas. 
 
Nor will DFID open programmes in countries on the basis of UK or global 
security considerations alone – there would have to be a prior and compelling 
poverty reduction case. But we and other development agencies can support 
programmes that enhance the human security of the poor in developing 
countries, and, in so doing, benefit everyone’s safety, whether rich or poor. 
(DfID 2005:23)  
 
The case is made to separate out DfID’s development concerns from foreign policy 
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considerations. The justification is the focus on Human Security, which will benefit 
the lives of all citizens. This is the last reference to Human Security in the chosen 
sample and does state the primary goal as being the safety of ordinary citizens. 
However, it does not correspond to the broad school’s focus on long term chronic 
problems that lead to insecurity; rather it still maintains the narrow focus on 
immediate threats to safety. The term is put forward as both a justification for a closer 
relationship between security and development actors and as a restriction on the 
extent of this relationship. 
 
Talking Around Human Security without Mentioning it 
 
Whilst there is no mention of the term Human Security in the subsequent White 
Papers, the 2009 White Paper does refer to many of the facets of the concept 
indirectly. When security is mentioned there is a consistent reference to ordinary 
citizens as the referent object: ‘Above all, we have put ordinary women, men and 
children first’ (DfID 2009: 7). This can be seen again;  
 
Delivering access to security and justice for ordinary people is at the heart of 
ensuring that our aid is both effective and does not ignore some of the most 
immediate threats to poor people’s lives. (DfID 2009: 75).  
 
Placing the individual rather than the state as the referent object of security 
exemplifies the Human Security agenda. As with the 2005 document, the emphasis is 
on immediate threats to individual’s security corresponding to the narrow school, but 
the referent object of security is ordinary people and not the state. This focus on 
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ordinary citizens draws on the central principle of Human Security, but without 
actually mentioning it. Again, the Human Security agenda of focusing on ordinary 
citizens is used as a restriction on the relationship between security and development 
and at the same time as a justification for a closer relationship between the two. 
 
This collective reference to Human Security as a restriction on DfID’s involvement in 
security is undermined by the inclusion of a WoT hard security agenda with the focus 
on failed states, terrorism and radicalism. The statement that the WoT and the war on 
poverty are inseparable (DfID 2005: 3) broadens the scope of DfID’s involvement in 
security to such an extent that the continued assertion of prioritising the poor loses 
meaning. Rather than security concerns taking into account development issues, DfID 
– a development agency - has given increased attention to hard security issues such as 
failed states and radicalism and has framed security and terrorism as development 
issues.  
 
A look at DfID sectoral spending over this period suggests that the issues discussed in 
this paper are not just confined to policy discourse. As Table 4 below indicates, a 
programme dedicated to ‘conflict, peace, and security’ was established by DfID in 
2006.  While there are limitations in using sectoral spending as an indicator of 
changed practice, it is worth comparing spending on ‘conflict, peace and security’ 
with other key sectors identified as on a par with security in DfID policy - ‘basic 
healthcare’, ‘basic education’, and ‘water and sanitation’. As Table 4 shows, for the 
years 2008-2010 spending on ‘conflict, peace and security’ was greater than either of 
these other traditional core development sectors. Whilst this is only a tentative 
finding, it shows that issues of security are not only prominent in DfID’s policy 
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discourse, but are present in the sectors that DfID spends in and in the countries that 
receive aid. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article argues that DfID has co-opted the main tenets of Human Security in order 
to justify its increased involvement in hard security concerns. This analysis is 
congruent with the arguments of Abrahamsen (2004, 2005), Duffield and Waddell 
(2006) and Stern and Öjendal (2010) that in bringing security into development 
policy, DfID has prioritised hard security concerns rather than maintaining a firm 
poverty reduction stance. It is also consistent with the work of Chandler (2008) on 
how states engage with the concept of Human Security. Instead of gaining greater 
recognition for development problems by framing them as security problems, the 
reverse has happened with DfID including hard security issues, such as terrorism and 
radicalism, as development problems. Pre-9/11 DfID advances a normative case for 
development as providing a better future for ‘us all’. However, the shift from a 
humanitarian perspective to one based on fear can be seen in the emotive example of 
terrorist attacks on London and New York originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan 
used in the 2009 White Paper to connect instability in the developing world to 
insecurity in the developed world. By 2011, action in relation to development 
problems is no longer framed as a moral obligation. Instead, development problems 
are framed as a source of fear and insecurity for the West. By framing security as a 
development problem, a range of perceived threats to national security can be 
addressed through development policies and justified through the discourse of Human 
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Security focusing on the poorest and most vulnerable. This shift is not just confined to 
policy discourse and can be seen in the introduction of a spending sector for ‘conflict, 
peace and security’, in 2006, which has received significant funds and the consistent 
presence of frontline WoT states in the top 10 recipients of DfID’s aid over this 
period of time.  
 
 
This research has implications for understanding the relationship between security and 
development and how state development agencies engage with it. NGOs and 
development practitioners support for a closer relationship between security and 
development rested on the assumption that it would lead to greater attention and 
resources for core development problems – security-sized budgets to resolve 
development problems. Advocates for the relationship within the academic literature 
drew on the same assumption to frame the closer relationship as a ‘virtuous cycle’ that 
would lead to greater security and development (Stewart 2004, Picciotto 2004). 
However, this paper demonstrates that in the case of DfID, security has been defined 
broadly and hard security concerns such as terrorism and religious extremism have 
now been prioritised as development problems. This research highlights the difficulty 
for NGOs in engaging with development and security. Without a clear definition what 
type of security and who it is to benefit, development goals could easily by side-lined.   
 Likewise, with the concept of Human Security, instead of states’ engagement with 
the concept being viewed as acceptance that will come to developmentalise security, 
instead a development agency has adopted some of its main tenets in a manner which 
securitises development. The abandonment by DfID of its pre-9/11, minimalist 
involvement in security, where democratic accountability of security forces and the 
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protection of the poor were paramount, is a regressive step. In a time of increasing 
economic and social instability in both the developing and developed world, where 
insecurity is often underpinned by economic, social and political marginalisation 
(World Bank, 2011), prioritising hard security concerns is unlikely to resolve these 
problems. A return to DfID’s original principles on involvement in security is more 
likely to bring greater security and development for the most vulnerable in the 
developing world. 
 
 
Endnotes
                                                 
1 When the term ‘security’ is mentioned in this article it refers to traditional or hard security. Softer 
definitions of security such as Security Sector Reform or Human Security will be mentioned 
specifically. 
2 The White Papers chosen for analysis are; Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st 
Century published in 1997, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor 
published in 2000, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor published in 
2006, Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future published in 2009. 
3 The policy document from 2011 is entitled UK aid: Changing Lives, delivering results. 
 
4 The security documents chosen for analysis are the 1999 policy statement titled Poverty and the 
Security Sector and the 2005 strategy paper on security titled Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: 
A Strategy for Security and Development. 
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Table 1: Top 10 Recipients of DfID ODA 1997-20111 
                                                 
1 Source OECD DAC 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
1 India 
153.96 
India 
186.60 
India 
131.68 
Uganda 
216.57 
Tanzani
a 
285.39 
Serbia 
459.74 
India 
329.88 
India 
370.15 
Nigeria 
2200.8
9 
Nigeria 
3185.7
4 
India 
510.53 
Iraq 
639.04 
India 
630.34 
India 
650.34 
Ethiopia 
552.25 
2 Guyana 
150.53 
Tanzani
a 
158.63 
Bangla
desh 
114.90 
India 
204.16 
Mozam
bique 
185.15 
India 
343.72 
Tanzani
a 
285.47 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
300.97 
Iraq 
1317.5
2 
India 
349.30 
Ethiopi
a 
291.07 
India 
613.12 
Ethiopia 
342.92 
Ethiopia 
406.95 
India 
453.85 
3 Zambia 
93.71 
Uganda 
105.56 
Uganda 
96.38 
Tanzania 
152.73 
India 
173.88 
Afghan
istan 
130.80 
Bangla
desh 
260.47 
Zambia 
282.55 
India 
579.24 
Afghan
istan 
246.49 
Nigeria 
285.95 
Afghanista
n 
322.31 
Afghanista
n 
324.39 
Pakistan 
298.51 
Afghanista
n 
423.42 
4 Uganda 
78.18 
Bangla
desh 
98.95 
Ghana 
91.78 
Zambia 
111.41 
Banglad
esh 
124.47 
Ghana 
122.49 
Iraq 
179.98 
Ghana 
280.03 
Tanzan
ia 
220.35 
Tanzan
ia 
218.86 
Afghan
istan 
268.71 
Pakistan 
260.32 
Sudan 
292.42 
Nigeria 
264.61 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
383.05 
5 Mozambique 
72.48 
Montse
rrat 
65.10 
Tanzani
a 
88.63 
Bangladesh 
103.36 
Ghana 
97.84 
Tanzan
ia 
109.31 
Ghana 
123.90 
Iraq 
275.10 
Afghan
istan 
219.92 
Sudan 
215.55 
Bangla
desh 
245.57 
Tanzania 
254.22 
Bangladesh 
250.08 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
250.78 
Bangladesh 
368.62 
6 Bangladesh 
70.29 
Ghana 
64.63 
Malawi 
77.27 
Malawi 
96.89 
Uganda 
82.22 
Bangla
desh 
101.82 
South 
Africa 
122.91 
Bangladesh 
252.72 
Bangla
desh 
203.27 
Uganda 
214.41 
Tanzan
ia 
230.69 
Ethiopia 
253.68 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
225.46 
Tanzania 
240.94 
Pakistan 
331.59 
7 Tanzania 
67.63 
Malawi 
56.65 
Zambia 
63.58 
Sts Ex-Yugo. 
Unspec. 
95.22 
Malawi 
63.94 
Peru 
84.43 
Pakista
n 
112.12 
Afghanista
n 
224.01 
Sudan 
196.46 
Pakista
n 
203.17 
Sudan 
206.17 
Bangladesh 
252.53 
Pakistan 
217.51 
Afghanista
n 
234.83 
Nigeria 
298.86 
8 Indonesia 
57.22 
China 
55.43 
South 
Africa 
62.92 
China 
83.44 
Zambia 
55.76 
Uganda 
83.98 
Malawi 
106.35 
Tanzania 
215.63 
Zambia 
165.73 
Iraq 
203.00 
Pakista
n 
197.84 
Sudan 
199.16 
Tanzania 
216.65 
Bangladesh 
228.32 
Mozambiq
ue 
186.40 
9 Sts Ex-
Yugo. 
Unspec. 
50.34 
South 
Africa 
54.12 
China 
59.25 
Mozambique 
82.66 
Kenya 
55.12 
Pakista
n 
66.90 
Uganda 
104.65 
Ethiopia 
147.13 
Ghana 
119.74 
Serbia 
180.49 
Uganda 
166.13 
Mozambiq
ue 
197.88 
Nigeria 
188.89 
Uganda 
179.26 
Tanzania 
158.92 
10 Kenya 
46.6 
Kenya 
54.08 
Kenya 
55.02 
Ghana 
79.91 
Sierra 
Leone 
51.13 
Kenya 
54.39 
Afghani
stan 
98.61 
Nigeria 
126.09 
Malawi 
101.96 
Malawi 
170.94 
China 
162.43 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
192.85 
Ghana 
153.93 
Ghana 
166.58 
Sudan 
157.34 
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Table2 Frequency of Usage of Key Security and Development Terms in DfID Documents 
Sampled from 1997-2011 
 
Table 3: Frequency of Usage of Key Security and Development Terms in DfIDs Documents from 
1997-2011 Shown as a Percentage of Words Counted per Document 
 
Term Year Published 
 1997 
White 
Paper 
2000 
White 
Paper 
1999 
Security 
Document 
2005 
Security 
Document 
2006 
White 
Paper 
2009 
White 
Paper 
2011 
Aid 
Review 
Poor 39.58% 38.56% 5.47% 15.45% 28.78% 27.82% 40.74% 
Poverty 25.46% 25.88% 4.69% 11.14% 25.05% 18.77% 32.59% 
   Poverty Elimination 12.04% 1.23% 1.56% 0.00% 1.04% 1.02% 0.00% 
   Poverty Reduction 2.08% 14.26% 0.78% 4.77% 6.83% 5.97% 0.74% 
Human Rights 5.56% 3.70% 4.69% 1.36% 4.35% 2.56% 0.00% 
Stability 4.86% 2.64% 2.34% 2.05% 1.86% 2.73% 2.22% 
Conflict 7.64% 8.80% 14.06% 22.27% 17.18% 17.58% 12.59% 
Security 2.78% 3.35% 52.34% 34.09% 9.32% 13.65% 8.15% 
   Human Security 0.00% 0.00% 0.78% 0.68% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
   Security Sector 
Reform 
0.00% 1.41% 13.28% 1.36% 0.21% 0.17% 0.00% 
Terrorism 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 5.68% 1.04% 1.19% 0.74% 
Radicalisation 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.62% 0.68% 0.74% 
Failed/Fragile State 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.73% 7.85% 1.48% 
 
Term Year Published 
 1997 
White 
Paper 
2000 
White 
Paper 
1999 
Security 
Document 
2005 
Security 
Document 
2006 
White 
Paper 
2009 
White 
Paper 
2011 
Aid 
Review 
Poor 171  219  7  68  139  163  55 
Poverty 110  147  6  49  121  110  44 
   Poverty Elimination 52 7 2 0 5 6 0 
   Poverty Reduction 9 81 1 21 33 35 1 
Human Rights 24 21 6 6 21 15 0 
Stability 21 15 3 9 9 16 3 
Conflict 33 50 18  98  83 103 17 
Security 12 19 67  150  45 80 11 
   Human Security 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 
   Security Sector 
Reform 
0 8 17 6 1 1 0 
Terrorism 0 1 0 25  5 7 1 
Radicalisation 0 0 0 1 3 4 1 
Failed/Fragile State 0 0 0 4 18 46 2 
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Table 4 Selected DfID Sector Spending 1997-20112 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Conflict, 
Peace & 
Security 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.88 184.9
3 
369.6
2 
393.2
1 
290.6
7 
293.9
7 
Basic 
Health 
Care 
19.38 74.02 51.01 132.2
7 
42.89 112.2 96.67 97.89 133.5
8 
141.5
9 
332.8
9 
226.2 386.1
5 
.. 663.3
1 
Basic 
Educatio
n 
23.86 34.97 67.56 70.72 67.56 68.36 233.2
7 
321.0
6 
191.7
1 
218.7
9 
331.5
6 
339.7
6 
326.3
4 
268.2
3 
421.2
5 
Water 
Supply 
and 
Sanitatio
n 
42.39 57.57 55.41 43.81 41.26 19.2 31.07 29.46 44.26 51.16 104.8
8 
160.6
6 
114.3
2 
156.9
4 
170.4
5 
 
 
                                                 
2 Source OECD DAC 
